Law, in its most general and comprehensive sense, signifies a rule of action; and is applied indiscriminately to all kinds of action, whether animate, or inanimate, rational or irrational. Thus we say, the laws of motion, of gravitation, of optics, or mechanics, as well as the laws of nature and of nations. And it is that rule of action, which is prescribed by some superior, and which the inferior is bound to obey.

Thus when the supreme being formed the universe, and created matter out of nothing, he impressed certain principles upon that matter, from which it can never depart, and without which it would cease to be. When he put that matter into motion, he established certain laws of motion, to which all moveable bodies must conform. And, to descend from the greatest operations to the smallest, when a workman forms a clock, or other piece of mechanism, he establishes at his own pleasure certain arbitrary laws for its direction; as that the hand shall describe a given space in a given time; to which law as long as the work conforms, so long it continues in perfection, and answers the end of its formation.

If we farther advance, from mere inactive matter to vegetable and animal life, we shall find them still governed by laws; more numerous indeed, but equally fixed and invariable. The whole progress of plants, from the seed to the root, and from thence to the seed again — the method of animal nutrition, digestion, secretion, and all other branches of vital economy; — are not left to chance, or the will of the creature itself, but are performed in a wondrous involuntary manner, and guided by unerring rules laid down by the great creator.

This then is the general signification of law, a rule of action dictated by some superior being; and in those creatures that have neither the power to think, nor to will, such laws must be invariably obeyed, so long as the creature itself subsists, for its existence depends on that obedience. But laws, in their more confined sense, and in which it is our present business to consider them, denote the rules, not of action in general, but of human action or conduct: that is, the precepts by which man, the noblest of all sublunary beings, a creature endowed with both reason and freewill, is commanded to make use of those faculties in the general regulation of his behavior.

Man, considered as a creature, must necessarily be subject to the laws of his creator, for he is entirely a dependent being. A being, independent of any other, has no rule to pursue, but such as he prescribes to himself; but a state of dependence will inevitably oblige the inferior to take the will of him, on whom, he
depends, as the rule of his conduct: not indeed in every particular, but in all those points wherein his
dependence consists. This principle therefore has more or less extent and effect, in proportion as the
superiority of the one and the dependence of the other is greater or less, absolute or limited. And
consequently as man depends absolutely upon his maker for everything, it is necessary that he should
in all points conform to his maker's will.

This will of his maker is called the law of nature. For as God, when he created matter, and endued it with
a principle of mobility, established certain rules for the perpetual direction of that motion; so, when he
created man, and endued him with freewill to conduct himself in all parts of life, he laid down certain
immutable laws of human nature, whereby that freewill is in some degree regulated and restrained, and
gave him also the faculty of reason to discover the purport of those laws.

Considering the creator only as a being of infinite power, he was able unquestionably to have prescribed
whatever laws he pleased to his creature, man, however unjust or severe. But as he is also a being of
infinite wisdom, he has laid down only such laws as were founded in those relations of justice, that
existed in the nature of things antecedent to any positive precept. These are the eternal, immutable
laws of good and evil, to which the creator himself in all his dispensations conforms; and which he has
enabled human reason to discover, so far as they are necessary for the conduct of human actions. Such
among others are these principles: that we should live honestly, should hurt nobody, and should render
to everyone its due; to which three general precepts Justinian[1] has reduced the whole doctrine of law.

But if the discovery of these first principles of the law of nature depended only upon the due exertion of
right reason, and could not otherwise be attained than by a chain of metaphysical disquisitions,
mankind would have wanted some inducement to have quickened their inquiries, and the greater part
of the world would have rested content in mental indolence, and ignorance it's [sic] inseparable
companion. As therefore the creator is a being, not only of infinite power, and wisdom, but also of
infinite goodness, he has been pleased so to contrive the constitution and frame of humanity, that we
should want no other prompter to enquire after and pursue the rule of right, but only our own self-love,
that universal principle of action. For he has so intimately connected, so inseparably interwoven the
laws of eternal justice with the happiness of each individual, that the latter cannot be attained but by
observing the former; and, if the former be punctually obeyed, it cannot but induce the latter. In
consequence of which mutual connection of justice and human felicity, he has not perplexed the law of
nature with a multitude of abstracted rules and precepts, referring merely to the fitness or unfitness of
things, as some have vainly surmised; but has graciously reduced the rule of obedience to this one
paternal precept, “that man should pursue his own happiness.” This is the foundation of what we call
ethics, or natural law. For the several articles into which it is branched in our systems, amount to no
more than demonstrating, that this or that action tends to man's real happiness, and therefore very
justly concluding that the performance of it is a part of the law of nature; or, on the other hand, that this
or that action is destructive of man's real happiness, and therefore that the law of nature forbids it.

This law of nature, being coeval with mankind and dictated by God himself, is of course superior in
obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe, in all countries, and at all times: no human laws
are of any validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid derive all their force, and all their
authority, mediately or immediately, from this original.

But in order to apply this to the particular exigencies of each individual, it is still necessary to have
recourse to reason; whose office it is to discover, as was before observed, what the law of nature directs
in every circumstance of life; by considering, what method will tend the most effectually to our own
substantial happiness. And if our reason were always, as in our first ancestor before his transgression,
clear and perfect, unruffled by passions, unclouded by prejudice, unimpaired by disease or in-
temperance, the task would be pleasant and easy; we should need no other guide but this. But every
man now finds the contrary in his own experience; that his reason is corrupt, and his understanding full
of ignorance and error.

This has given manifold occasion for the benign interposition of divine providence which, in compassion
to the frailty, the imperfection, and the blindness of human reason, hath been pleased, at sundry times and in divers manners, to discover and enforce its laws by an immediate and direct revelation. The doctrines thus delivered we call the revealed or divine law, and they are to be found only in the holy scriptures. These precepts, when revealed, are found upon comparison to be really a part of the original law of nature, as they tend in all their consequences to man's felicity. But we are not from thence to conclude that the knowledge of these truths was attainable by reason, in its present corrupted state; since we find that, until they were revealed, they were hid from the wisdom of ages. As then the moral precepts of this law are indeed of the same original with those of the law of nature, so their intrinsic obligation is of equal strength and perpetuity. Yet undoubtedly the revealed law is (humanly speaking) of infinitely more authority than what we generally call the natural law. Because one is the law of nature, expressly declared so to be by God himself; the other is only what, by the assistance of human reason, we imagine to be that law. If we could be as certain of the latter as we are of the former, both would have an equal authority but, till then, they can never be put in any competition together.

Upon these two foundations, the law of nature and the law of revelation, depend all human laws; that is to say, no human laws should be suffered to contradict these. There is, it is true, a great number of indifferent points, in which both the divine law and the natural leave a man at his own liberty; but which are found necessary for the benefit of society to be restrained within certain limits. And herein it is that human laws have their greatest force and efficacy for, with regard to such points as are not indifferent, human laws are only declaratory of, and act in subordination to, the former. To instance in the case of murder: this is expressly forbidden by the divine, and demonstrably by the natural law; and from these prohibitions arises the true unlawfulness of this crime. Those human laws, that annex a punishment to it, do not at all increase its moral guilt, or super-add any fresh obligation in foro conscientiae to abstain from its perpetration. Nay, if any human law should allow or enjoin us to commit it, we are bound to transgress that human law, or else we must offend both the natural and the divine. But with regard to matters that are in themselves indifferent, and are not commanded or forbidden by those superior laws; such, for instance, as exporting of wool into foreign countries; here the inferior legislature has scope and opportunity to interpose, and to make that action unlawful which before was not so.

If man were to live in a state of nature, unconnected with other individuals, there would be no occasion for any other laws, than the law of nature, and the law of God. Neither could any other law possibly exist for a law always supposes some superior who is to make it; and in a state of nature we are all equal, without any other superior but him who is the author of our being. But man was formed for society; and, as is demonstrated by the writers on this subject,[2], is neither capable of living alone, nor indeed has the courage to do it. However, as it is impossible for the whole race of mankind to be united in one great society, they must necessarily divide into many; and form separate states, commonwealths, and nations; entirely independent of each other, and yet liable to a mutual intercourse. Hence arises a third kind of law to regulate this mutual intercourse, called "the law of nations;" which, as none of these states will acknowledge a superiority in the other, cannot be dictated by either; but depends entirely upon the rules of natural law, or upon mutual compacts, treaties, leagues, and agreements between these several communities: in the construction also of which compacts we have no other rule to resort to, but the law of nature being the only one to which both communities are equally subject: and therefore the civil law very justly observes, that quod naturalis ratio inter omnes homines constituit, vocatur jus gentium.[3]

Thus much I thought it necessary to premise concerning the law of nature, the revealed law, and the law of nations, before I proceeded to treat more fully of the principal subject of this section, municipal or civil law; that is, the rule by which particular districts, communities, or nations are governed; being thus defined by Justinian, "jus ci5ville est quod quisque sibi populus constituit."[4] I call it municipal law, in compliance with common speech; for, though strictly that expression denotes the particular customs of one single municipium or free town, yet it may with sufficient propriety be applied to any one state or nation, which is governed by the same laws and customs.

Municipal law, thus understood, is properly defined to be “a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in “a state, commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong.” Let us endeavour
to explain its several properties, as they arise out of this definition.

And, first, it is a rule; not a transient sudden order from a superior to or concerning a particular person; but something permanent, uniform, and universal. Therefore a particular act of the legislature to confiscate the goods of Titius, or to attain him of high treason, does not enter into the idea of a municipal law: for the operation of this act is spent upon Titius only, and has no relation to the community in general; it is rather a sentence than a law. But an act to declare that the crime of which Titius is accused shall be deemed high treason; this has permanency, uniformity, and universality, and therefore is properly a rule. It is also called a rule, to distinguish it from advice or counsel, which we are at liberty to follow or not, as we see proper; and to judge upon the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the thing advised. Whereas our obedience to the law depends not upon our approbation, but upon the maker's will. Counsel is only matter of persuasion, law is matter of injunction; counsel acts only upon the willing, law upon the unwilling also.

It is also called a rule, to distinguish it from a compact or agreement; for a compact is a promise proceeding from us, law a command directed to us. The language of a compact is, “I will, or will not, do this;” that of a law is, “thou shalt, or shalt not, do it.” It is true there is an obligation which a compact carries with it, equal in point of conscience to that of a law; but then the original of the obligation is different. In compacts, we ourselves determine and promise what shall be done, before we are obliged to do it; in laws, we are obliged to act, without ourselves determining or promising anything at all. Upon these accounts law is defined to be “a rule.”

Municipal law is also “a rule of civil conduct.” This distinguishes municipal law from the natural, or revealed; the former of which is the rule of moral conduct, and the latter not only the rule of moral conduct, but also the rule of faith. These regard man as a creature, and point out his duty to God, to himself, and to his neighbor, considered in the light of an individual. But municipal or civil law regards him also as a citizen, and bound to other duties towards his neighbor, than those of mere nature and religion: duties, which he has engaged in by enjoying the benefits of the common union; and which amount to no more, than that he do contribute, on his part, to the subsistence and peace of the society.

It is likewise “a rule prescribed.” Because a bare resolution, confined in the breast of the legislator, without manifesting itself by some external sign, can never be properly a law. It is requisite that this resolution be notified to the people who are to obey it. But the manner in which this notification is to be made, is matter of very great indifference. It may be notified by universal tradition and long practice, which supposes a previous publication, and is the case of the common law of England. It may be notified, viva voce, by officers appointed for that purpose, as is done with regard to proclamations, and such acts of parliament as are appointed to be publicly read in churches and other assemblies. It may lastly be notified by writing, printing, or the like; which is the general course taken with all our acts of parliament. Yet, whatever way is made use of, it is incumbent on the promulgators to do it in the soft public and perspicuous manner; not like Caligula, who (according to Dio Cassius) wrote his laws in a very small character, and hung them up upon high pillars, the more effectually to ensnare the people. There is still a more unreasonable method than this, which is called making of laws ex post facto; when after an action is committed, the legislator then for the first time declares it to have been a crime, and inflicts a punishment upon the person who has committed it; here it is impossible that the party could foresee that an action, innocent when it was done, should be afterwards converted to guilt by a subsequent law; he had therefore no cause to abstain from it; and all punishment for not abstaining must of consequence be cruel and unjust. All laws should be therefore made to commence in futuro, and be notified before their commencement; which is implied in the term “prescribed.” But when this rule is in the usual manner notified, or prescribed, it is then the subject’s business to be thoroughly acquainted therewith; for if ignorance, of what he might know, were admitted as a legitimate excuse, the laws would be of no effect, but might always be eluded with impunity.

But farther: municipal law is “a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a state.” For legislature, as was before observed, is the greatest act of superiority that can be exercised by one being over another. Wherefore it is requisite to the very essence of a law, that it be made by the supreme
power. Sovereignty and legislature are indeed convertible terms; one cannot subsist without the other.

This will naturally lead us into a short enquiry concerning the nature of society and civil government; and the natural, inherent right that belongs to the sovereignty of a state, wherever that sovereignty be lodged, of making and enforcing laws.

The only true and natural foundations of society are the wants and the fears individuals. Not that we can believe, with some theoretical writers, that there ever was a time when there was no such thing as society; and that, from the impulse of reason, and through a sense of their wants and weaknesses, individuals met together in a large plain, entered into an original contract, and chose the tallest man present to be their governor. This notion, of an actually existing unconnected state of nature, is too wild to be seriously admitted; and besides it is plainly contradictory to the revealed accounts of the primitive origin of mankind, and their preservation two thousand years afterwards; both which were effected by the means of single families. These formed the first society, among themselves; which every day extended its limits, and when it grew too large to subsist with convenience in that pastoral state, wherein the patriarchs appear to have lived, it necessarily subdivided itself by various migrations into more. Afterwards, as agriculture increased, which employs and can maintain a much greater number of hands, migrations became less frequent; and various tribes, which had formerly separated, reunited again; sometimes by compulsion and conquest, sometimes by accident and sometimes perhaps by compact. But though society had not its formal beginning from any convention of individuals, actuated by their wants and their fears; yet it is the sense of their weakness and imperfection that keeps mankind together; that demonstrates the necessity of this union; and that therefore is the solid and natural foundation, as well as the cement, of society. And this is what we mean by the original contract of society; which, though perhaps in no instance it has ever been formally expressed at the first institution of a state, yet in nature and reason must always be understood and implied, in the very act of associating together: namely, that the whole should protect all its parts, and that every part should pay obedience to the will of the whole; or, in other words, that the community should guards the rights of each individual member, and that (in return for this protection) each individual should submit to the laws of the community; without which submission of all it was impossible that protection could be certainly extended to any.

For when society is once formed, government results of course, as necessary to preserve and to keep that society in order. Unless some superior were constituted, whose commands and decisions all the members are bound to obey, they would still remain as in a state of nature, without any judge upon earth to define their several rights, and redress their several wrongs. But, as all the members of society are naturally equal, it may be asked, in whose hands are the reins of government to be entrusted? To this the general answer is easy; but the application of it to particular cases has occasioned one half of those mischiefs which are apt to proceed from misguided political zeal. In general, all mankind will agree that government should be reposed in such persons, in whom those qualities are most likely to be found, the perfection of which are among the attributes of him who is emphatically styled the supreme being; the three grand requisites, I mean, of wisdom, of goodness, and of power: wisdom, to discern the real interest of the community; goodness, to endeavour always to pursue that real interest; and strength, or power, to carry this knowledge and intention into action. These are the natural foundations of sovereignty, and these are the requisites that ought to be found in every well constituted frame of government.

How the several forms of government we now see in the world at first actually began, is matter of great uncertainty, and has occasioned infinite disputes. It is not my business or intention to enter into any of them. However they began, or by what right so ever they subsist, there is and must be in all of them a supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority, in which the jura summi imperii, or the rights of sovereignty, reside. And this authority is placed in those hands, wherein (according to the opinion of the founders of such respective states, either expressly given, or collected from their tacit approbation) the qualities requisite for supremacy, wisdom, goodness, and power, are the most likely to be found.

The political writers of antiquity will not allow more than three regular forms of government; the first,
when the sovereign power is lodged in an aggregate assembly consisting of all the members of a
community, which is called a democracy; the second, when it is lodged in a council, composed of select
members, and then it is styled an aristocracy; the last, when it is entrusted in the hands of a single
person, and then it takes the name of a monarchy. All other species of government, they say, are either
corruptions of, or reducible to, these three.

From what has been advanced, the truth of the former branch of our definition, is (I trust) sufficiently
evident; that “municipal law is a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a state.” I
proceed now to the latter branch of it; that it is a rule so prescribed, “commanding what is right, and
prohibiting what is wrong.”

Now in order to do this completely, it is first of all necessary that the boundaries of right and wrong be
established and ascertained by law. And when this is once done, it will follow of course that it is likewise
the business of the law, considered as a rule of civil conduct, to enforce these rights and to restrain or
redress these wrongs. It remains therefore only to consider in what manner the law is said to ascertain
the boundaries of rights and wrong; and the methods which it takes to command the one and prohibit
the other.

For this purpose every law may be said to consist of several parts: one, declaratory; whereby the rights
to be observed, and the wrongs to be eschewed, are clearly defined and laid down: another, directory;
whereby the subject is instructed and enjoined to observe those rights, and to abstain from the
commission of those wrongs: a third, remedial; whereby a method is pointed out to recover a man's
private rights, or redress his private wrongs: to which may be added a fourth, usually termed the
sanction, or indicatory branch of the law; whereby it is signified what evil or penalty shall be incurred by
such as commit any public wrongs, and transgress or neglect their duty.

With regard to the first of these, the declaratory part of the municipal law, this depends not so much
upon the law of revelation or of nature, as upon the wisdom and will of the legislator. This doctrine,
which before was slightly touched, deserves a more particular explication. Those rights then which God
and nature have established, and are therefore called natural rights, such as are life and liberty, need
not the aid of human laws to be more effectually invested in every man than they are; neither do they
receive any additional strength when declared by the municipal laws to be inviolable. On the contrary,
no human legislature has power to abridge or destroy them, unless the owner shall himself commit
some act that amounts to a forfeiture. Neither do divine or natural duties (such as, for instance, the
worship of God, the maintenance of children, and the like) receive any stronger sanction from being also
declared to be duties by the law of the land. The case is the same as to crimes and misdemeanors, that
are forbidden by the superior laws, and therefore styled mala in se, such as murder, theft, and perjury;
which contract no additional turpitude from being declared unlawful by the inferior legislature. For that
legislature in all these cases acts only, as was before observed, in subordination to the great lawgiver,
transcribing and publishing his precepts. So that, upon the whole, the declaratory part of the municipal
law has no force or operation at all, with regard to actions that are naturally and intrinsically right or
wrong.

But with regard to things in themselves indifferent, the case is entirely altered. These become either
right or wrong, just or unjust, duties or misdemeanors, according as the municipal legislator sees
proper, for promoting the welfare of the society, and more effectually carrying on the purposes of civil
life. Thus our own common law has declared, that the goods of the wife do instantly upon marriage
become the property and right of the husband; and our statute law declared all monopolies a public
offence: yet that right, and this offence, have no foundation in nature; but are merely created by the
law, for the purposes of civil society. And sometimes, where the thing itself has its rise from the law of
nature, the particular circumstances and mode of doing it become right or wrong, as the laws of the
land shall direct. Thus, for instance, in civil duties; obedience to superiors is the doctrine of revealed
as well as natural religion: but who those superiors shall be, and in what circumstances, or to what degrees
they shall be obeyed, is the province of human laws to determine. And so, as to injuries or crimes, it must be left to our own legislature to decide, in what cases the seizing another's cattle shall amount to the crime of robbery; and where it shall be a justifiable action, as when a landlord takes them by way of distress for rent.

Thus much for the declaratory part of the municipal law: and the directory stands much upon the same footing; for this virtually includes the former, the declaration being usually collected from the direction. The law that says, “thou shalt not steal,” implies a declaration that stealing is a crime. And we have seen that, in things naturally indifferent, the very essence of right and wrong depends upon the direction of the laws to do or to omit it.

The remedial part of a law is so necessary a consequence of the former two, that laws must be very vague and imperfect without it. For in vain would rights be declared, in vain directed to be observed, if there were no method of recovering and asserting those rights, when wrongfully withheld or invaded. This is what we mean properly, when we speak of the protection of the law.

With regard to the sanction of laws, or the evil that may attend the breach of public duties; it is observed, that human legislators have for the most part chosen to make the sanction of their laws rather vindicatory than remuneratory, or to consist rather in punishments, than in actual particular rewards. Because, in the first place, the quiet enjoyment and protection of all our civil rights and liberties, which are the sure and general consequence of obedience to the municipal law, are in themselves the best and most valuable of all rewards. Because also, were the exercise of every virtue to be enforced by the proposal of particular rewards, it were impossible for any state to furnish stock enough for so profuse a bounty. And farther, because the dread of evil is a much more forcible principle of human actions than the prospect of good.

Of all the parts of a law the most effectual is the vindicatory. For it is but lost labour to say, “do this, or avoid that,” unless we also declare, “this shall be the consequence of your noncompliance.” We must therefore observe, that the main strength and force of a law consists in the penalty annexed to it. Herein is to be found the principal obligation of human laws.

Legislators and their laws are said to compel and oblige; not that by any natural violence they so constrain a man, as to render it impossible for him to act otherwise than as they direct, which is the strict sense of obligation: but because, by declaring and exhibiting a penalty against offenders, they bring it to pass that no man can easily choose to transgress the law; since, by reason of the impending correction, compliance is in a high degree preferable to disobedience. And, even where rewards are proposed as well as punishments threatened, the obligation of the law seems chiefly to consist in the penalty annexed to it. It is held, it is true, and very justly, by the principal of our ethical writers, that human laws are binding upon men’s consciences. But if that were the only, or most forcible obligation, the good only would regard the laws, and the bad would set them at defiance. And, true as this principle is, it must still be understood with some restriction. It holds, I apprehend, as to rights; and that, when the law has determined the field to belong to Titius, it is matter of conscience no longer to withhold or to invade it. So also in regard to natural duties, and such offences as are mala in se: here we are bound in conscience, because we are bound by superior laws, before those human laws were in being, to perform the one and abstain from the other. But in relation to those laws which enjoin only positive duties, and forbid only such things as are not mala in se but mala prohibita merely, annexing a penalty to noncompliance, here I apprehend conscience is no farther concerned, than by directing a submission to the penalty, in case of our breach of those laws: for otherwise the multitude of penal laws in a state would not only be looked upon as an impolitic, but would also be a very wicked thing; if every such law were a snare for the conscience of the subject. But in these cases the alternative is offered to every man; “either abstain from this, or submit to such a penalty;” and his conscience will be clear, whichever side of the alternative he thinks proper to embrace. Thus, by the statutes for preserving the game, a
penalty is denounced against every unqualified person that kills a hare. Now this prohibitory law does not make the transgression a moral offence: the only obligation in conscience is to submit to the penalty if levied.

I have now gone through the definition laid down of a municipal law; and have shown that it is “a rule...of civil conduct...prescribed...by the supreme power in state...commanding what is right, and prohibiting what is wrong;” in the explication of which I have endeavoured to interweave a few useful principles, concerning the nature of civil government, and the obligation of human laws. . . .

[1] *Juris praecepta sunt haec, honeste vivere, alterum non laedere, suum cuique tribuere.* [The precepts of the law are these, to live honestly, not to injure another, and to give to everyone his due.] Justinian, *Institutes*, Book I, I.3.


[3] “That which natural reason has established among all men, . . . is called the law of nations.” Justinian, *Digests (Pandects), Book I, Tit. 1*, no. 9, quoting Gaius, *Institutes*, Book I. Compare Justinian, *Institutes*, Book I, II.1


[5] Such laws among the Romans were denominated privilegia, or private laws, of which Cicero (in his *Oratio pro domo, section 43*; compare Cicero, *De Legibus*, Book 3, XIX[44]) thus speaks: “Vetant leges sacrae vetant duodecim tabulae, leges privates hominibus inogari; id enim est privilegium. Nemo unquam tuli, nihil est crudelius, nihil perniciosius, nihil quod minus haec civitas serre possit.” [“The sacred laws forbid, the twelve tables forbid, that the interest of private individuals should be affected by special laws; for that is a privilege. There has never been an instance of it: nothing could be more cruel, nothing more injurious, nothing to which this nation could be less tolerable.”]