Reflections on the Revolution in France

(Excerpts)

By Edmund Burke

1790


Pages 192–195:

Society is indeed a contract. Subordinate contracts, for objects of mere occasional interest, may be dissolved at [[193]] pleasure; but the state ought not to be considered as nothing better than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee, callicio or tobacco, or some other such low concern, to be taken up for a little temporary interest,[114] and to be dissolved by the fancy of the parties. It is to be looked on with other reverence; because it is not a partnership in things subservient only to the gross animal existence of a temporary and perishable nature. It is a partnership in all science; a partnership in all art; a partnership in every virtue, and in all perfection. As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born. Each contract of each particular state is but a clause in the great primaeval contract of eternal society, linking the lower with the higher natures, connecting the visible and invisible world, according to a fixed compact sanctioned by the inviolable oath which holds all physical and all moral natures, each in their appointed place. This law is not subject to the will of those, who by an obligation above them, and infinitely superior, are bound to submit their will to that law. The municipal corporations of that universal kingdom are not morally at liberty at their pleasure, and on their speculations of a contingent improvement, wholly to separate and tear asunder the bands of their subordinate community, and to dissolve it into an unsocial, uncivil, unconnected chaos of elementary principles. It is the first and supreme necessity only, a necessity that is not chosen but chooses, a necessity paramount to deliberation, that admits no discussion, and demands no evidence, which alone can justify a resort to anarchy. This necessity is no exception to the rule; because this necessity itself is a part too of that moral and physical disposition of things to which man must be obedient by consent or force. But if that which is only submission to necessity should be made the object of choice, the law is broken; nature is [[194]] disobeyed; and the rebellious are outlawed, cast forth, and exiled, from this world of reason, and order, and peace, and virtue, and fruitful penitence,[115] into the antagonist world of madness, discord, vice, confusion, and unavailing sorrow.

These, my dear Sir, are, were, and I think long will be the sentiments of not the least learned and
reflecting part of this kingdom [France]. They who are included in this description form their opinions on such grounds as such persons ought to form them. The less enquiring receive them from an authority which those whom Providence dooms to live on trust need not be ashamed to rely on. These two sorts of men move in the same direction, tho’ in a different place. They both move with the order of the universe. They all know or feel this great antient truth: "Quod illi principi et praepotenti Deo qui omnem hunc mundum regit, nihil eorum quae quidem fiat in terris acceptius quam concilia et coetus hominum jure sociati quae civitates appellantur," ["That in the eyes of that principal and surpassingly powerful God who rules this whole world, none of the things that come to be on earth is more acceptable than the councils and gatherings of men, joined together by law, which are called states"]. They take this tenet of the head and heart, not from the great name which it immediately bears, nor from the greater from whence it is derived; but from that which alone can give true weight and sanction to any learned opinion, the common nature and common relation of men. Persuaded that all things ought to be done with reference, and referring all to the point of reference to which all should be directed, they think themselves bound, not only as individuals in the sanctuary of the heart, or as congregated in that personal capacity, to renew the memory of their high origin and cast; but also in their corporate character to perform their national homage to the institutor, and author and protector of civil society; without which civil society man could not by any possibility arrive at the perfection of which his nature is capable, nor even make a remote and faint approach to it. They conceive that He who gave our nature to be perfected by our virtue, willed also the necessary means of its perfection. He willed therefore the state; He willed its [[195]] connexion[116] with the source and original archetype of all perfection. They who are convinced of this his will, which is the law of laws and the sovereign of sovereigns, cannot think it reprehensible, that this our corporate fealty and homage, that this our recognition of a seigniory paramount, I had almost said this oblation of the state itself, as a worthy offering on the high altar of universal praise, should be performed, as all publick solemn acts are performed, in buildings, in musick, in decoration, in speech, in the dignity of persons, according to the customs of mankind, taught by their nature; that is, with modest splendour, with unassuming state, with mild majesty and sober pomp. For those purposes they think some part of the wealth of the country is as usefully employed, as it can be in fomenting the luxury of individuals. It is the publick ornament. It is the publick consolation. It nourishes the publick hope. The poorest man finds his own importance and dignity in it, whilst the wealth and pride of individuals at every moment makes the man of humble rank and fortune sensible of his inferiority, and degrades and vilifies his condition. It is for the man in humble life, and to raise his nature, and to put him in mind of a state in which the privileges of opulence will cease, when he will be equal by nature, and may be more than equal by virtue—that this portion of the general wealth of his country is employed and sanctified.

Pages 255/179–257/180:

I see, in a country very near us [France], a course of policy pursued, which sets justice, the common concern of mankind, at defiance. With the national assembly of France, possession is nothing; law and usage are nothing. I see the national assembly openly reprobate the doctrine of prescription,[11] which one of the greatest of their own lawyers tells us, with great truth, is a part of the law of nature. He tells us, that the positive ascertainment of its limits, and its security from invasion, were among the causes for which civil society itself has been instituted. If prescription be once shaken, no species of property is secure, when it once becomes an object large enough to tempt the cupidity of indigent power. I see a practice perfectly correspondent to their contempt of this great fundamental part of natural law. I see the confiscators begin with bishops, and chapters, and monasteries; but I do not see them end there. I [256] see the princes of the blood, who, by the oldest usages of that kingdom, held large landed estates, (hardly with the compliment of a debate) deprived of their possessions, and in lieu of their stable independent property, reduced to the hope of some precarious, charitable pension, at the pleasure of an assembly, which of course will pay little regard to the rights of pensioners at pleasure, when it despises those of legal proprietors. Flushed with the insolence of their first inglorious victories,
and pressed by the distresses caused by their lust of unhallowed lucre, disappointed but not
discouraged, they have at length ventured completely to subvert all property of all descriptions
throughout the extent of a great[180] kingdom. They have compelled all men, in all transactions of
commerce, in the disposal of lands, in civil dealing, and through the whole communion of life, to accept
as perfect payment and good and lawful tender, the symbols of their speculations on a projected sale of
their plunder. What vestiges of liberty or property have they left? The tenant-right of a cabbage-garden,
a year’s interest in a hovel, the good-will of an ale-house, or a baker’s shop, the very shadow of a
constructive property, are more ceremoniously treated in our parliament than with you the oldest and
most valuable landed possessions, in the hands of the most respectable personages, or than the whole
body of the monied and commercial interest of your country. We entertain an high opinion of the
legislative authority; but we have never dreamt that parliaments had any right whatever to violate
property, to overrule prescription, or to force a currency of their own fiction in the place of that which is
real, and recognized by the law of nations. But you, who began with refusing to submit to the most
moderate restraints, have ended by establishing an unheard of despotism. I find the ground upon which
your confiscators go is this; that indeed their proceedings could not be supported in a court of justice;
but that the rules of [[257]] prescription cannot bind a legislative assembly. So that this legislative
assembly of a free nation sits, not for the security, but for the destruction of property, and not of
property only, but of every rule and maxim which can give it stability, and of those instruments which
can alone give it circulation.

[1] “Prescription” in property means an owner’s right to maintain ownership of property simply by the
fact that he has held it for as long as anyone can remember, even if he can produce no written deed to
prove his ownership. –Site Editor

Original Author Sort: Burke, Edmund
Publication Date: 11790.00.00.00
Topic: Natural Law and Natural Rights in the American Constitutional Tradition
Subtopic: Modern Constitutionalism
Publication Date Range: 1790

Source URL: